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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
These appeals arise from a judgment entered in the 
District Court on separate jury verdicts in favor of a 
transportation contractor and his wife in their respective 
civil rights and civil conspiracy suits against a local 
government entity and its officials. Donald Boyanowski 
alleged that his efforts to furnish transportation services to 
school districts failed because of conduct by local officials 
that violated his substantive due process rights. Dorothy 
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Boyanowski claimed to have been the victim of a civil 
conspiracy by two local officials that prevented her from 
receiving contracts to work as a bus driver. The appeal of 
the verdict in Donald Boyanowski's favor requires 
consideration of the relation, and separation, between 
federal constitutional and state tort actions. The appeal of 
the verdict in Dorothy Boyanowski's favor presents the 
question whether a plaintiff 's verdict for (state law) civil 
conspiracy can survive when the jury has found for the 
defendant on the underlying tort. 
 
The first verdict, in favor of Donald Boyanowski and 
against his former employer, the Capital Area Intermediate 
Unit ("CAIU"), was entered on his claim that the CAIU's 
conduct violated his substantive due process rights. He also 
won a verdict against John Nagle, who had been executive 
director of the CAIU, but the District Court set it aside on 
qualified immunity grounds. Mr. Boyanowski's claims are 
essentially state tort defamation claims that do not 
implicate a federal constitutional interest. Constitutional 
claims of this sort have been implicitly rejected by the 
Supreme Court, see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991), 
and find no basis in our jurisprudence. We will therefore 
set aside the jury verdict in Mr. Boyanowski's favor. In light 
of our conclusion that he has not been deprived of 
constitutionally protected rights, there is no need to 
consider his cross-appeal of the District Court's decision to 
grant Nagle qualified immunity. 
 
The second verdict, in favor of Dorothy Boyanowski 
against two CAIU officials, is for civil conspiracy. She 
claimed that officers of the CAIU conspired to interfere with 
her contract rights as part of their campaign against her 
husband. The jury found in her favor on her civil 
conspiracy complaint while rejecting her claim for tortious 
interference with contract. In light of the jury'sfinding that 
the underlying tort did not occur, we conclude that the civil 
conspiracy claim can not survive. See GMH Assoc., Inc. v. 
Prudential Realty Group, CB, ___ A.2d ___, No. 198 EDA 
1999, 2000 WL 228918 (Pa. Super. Ct. March 1, 2000); 
Pelagatti v. Cohen, 536 A.2d 1337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). We 
will therefore set aside the verdict on civil conspiracy as 
well, and remand with directions to enter judgment for the 
defendants on all counts. 
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I. 
 
The CAIU is a governmental entity operating under 
Pennsylvania's public school laws. Intermediate units 
 
("IUs") are part of the state's public school system and 
operate service programs that are open to the local public 
school districts assigned to each intermediate unit. See Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 24 S 9-951 et seq. The board of directors of 
the IU is elected from the boards of directors of the 
component school districts. See id. S 9-960. The CAIU is 
one of twenty-nine IUs in the state. See id.S 9-952. The 
CAIU provides transportation for disabled children to and 
from classes and programs throughout the unit's region. It 
does so through a combination of employees and 
independent contractors. Prior to his retirement in July 
1993, defendant John Nagle, as is noted above, was 
Executive Director of the CAIU. Defendant Edward Frye was 
the Assistant Executive Director and succeeded Nagle as 
Executive Director. 
 
Until his retirement in March 1993, Donald Boyanowski 
was the CAIU transportation supervisor. After retiring, he 
established Boyo Transportation Services, Inc. ("Boyo"), 
which sought to contract for special transportation services 
with the member school districts of the CAIU. This entailed 
convincing them to no longer acquire such services through 
the CAIU. Mr. Boyanowski was therefore effectively 
competing with his former employer. Having been 
unsuccessful in persuading any member districts to accept 
his contract proposals, he brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, contending that his lack of success was the product 
of a violation of his substantive due process rights. At trial, 
he produced evidence that Nagle unfairly blamed him for 
rising costs of the CAIU program that occurred while he 
was a supervisor, and had referred to Mr. Boyanowski as a 
"crook" in a meeting of the CAIU superintendents council. 
Mr. Boyanowski alleged these actions were part of a 
concerted effort to keep him from obtaining any contracts. 
 
The jury found that the CAIU's and Nagle's conduct 
violated Mr. Boyanowski's substantive due process rights, 
and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of 
$50,000 against the CAIU and $100,000 against Nagle. The 
jury also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages against 
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Nagle. On post-trial motions, the District Court ruled that 
Nagle was entitled to qualified immunity on the substantive 
due process claim, and it set aside the verdict and damages 
against him. The CAIU appeals the substantive due process 
judgment against it, and Mr. Boyanowski cross appeals the 
grant of qualified immunity to Nagle. 
 
The jury also considered several claims brought by 
Dorothy Boyanowski. She had been employed as an 
independent contractor bus driver for the CAIU. After her 
husband established Boyo, Ms. Boyanowski's contract was 
not renewed. She contended that Frye and Nagle engaged in 
conduct that amounted to tortious interference with 
contract against her as well as a civil conspiracy. She 
produced evidence at trial not only that her contract was 
not renewed, but also that Frye had made statements that 
were relayed to one of CAIU's busing contractors that hiring 
her would not be a "good idea," and that this 
communication occurred while Nagle was still in charge. 
Ms. Boyanowski also produced evidence that Nagle had 
sent her a letter informing her that her contract would not 
be renewed. The jury found for the defendants on the 
tortious interference with contract claim, but ruled in Ms. 
Boyanowski's favor as to the civil conspiracy, awarding her 
$50,000 against Nagle and $100,000 against Frye. The 
defendants also appeal this judgment. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Donald 
Boyanowski's civil rights claim under 28 U.S.C.SS 1331, 
1343. It had supplemental jurisdiction over Dorothy 
Boyanowski's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367. Our jurisdiction over the District Court's final order 
is based on 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of all legal 
questions is plenary. 
 
II. 
 
The core of due process is the protection against 
arbitrary governmental action and has procedural and 
substantive components. See County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998). The substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause limits what 
government may do regardless of the fairness of procedures 
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that it employs, and covers government conduct in both 
legislative and executive capacities. See id.  at 846. The 
CAIU's appeal requires us to address executive conduct 
alleged to have infringed upon Donald Boyanowski's rights 
as protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
Unfortunately for Mr. Boyanowski, his substantive due 
process claim is properly read as a state law defamation 
claim. This is even made clear by his own brief, which 
indicates that his S 1983 claim is based on defamation and 
exists solely to circumvent Pennsylvania sovereign 
immunity against state tort claims. As the Boyanowskis' 
brief recites: 
 
       According to appellants, if a government entity is 
       interested in doing business, and in the process uses 
       its political power and muscle to systematically destroy 
       the business opportunities of a competing private 
       citizen through slur, innuendo, and outright false 
       accusations, then the misconduct is simply not 
       actionable. In Pennsylvania sovereign immunity 
       protects government from tortious interference with 
       contracts suits. Appellants know there is no adequate 
       recourse under state defamation law also because of 
       sovereign immunity statutes. 
 
Appellee's Br. at 8 (emphasis added). Of course the lack of 
availability of a state law remedy will not serve to elevate an 
ordinary tort to a constitutional violation. The degree to 
which Pennsylvania wishes to waive sovereign immunity 
claims for state causes of action is the quintessence of a 
state law question. 
 
In instructing the jury on Mr. Boyanowski's substantive 
due process claim, the District Court charged: 
 
        You must first decide if each of plaintiffs were 
       deprived of a fundamental right. You are advised that 
       there is no constitutionally protected right to obtain 
       future government contracts, and that suspension or 
       debarment from bidding on government contracts may 
       be a basis for liability only if it is based upon a charge 
       of fraud or dishonesty. 
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        Plaintiffs must therefore show that the government 
       officials stigmatized plaintiff by publishing charges of 
       fraud or dishonesty which were substantially and 
       materially false, and that the defendants making them 
       knew they were false or had serious doubts about the 
       truth of these statements, and that those statements 
       had the effect of preventing plaintiff from engaging in 
       the transportation business. 
 
App. 100. 
 
Assuming arguendo that the jury's verdict for Mr. 
Boyanowski on this charge was supported by the evidence, 
we must determine if the substance of the charge was 
correct, i.e., whether defamatory statements that curtail a 
plaintiff 's business opportunities suffice to support a 
substantive due process claim. At the outset of this inquiry, 
we must be mindful of the Supreme Court's commands in 
addressing the interplay of constitutional and state tort 
law. First, the Fourteenth Amendment is not "a font of tort 
law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may 
already be administered by the States." Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Second, we must remember that"[a]s 
a general matter, the [Supreme] Court has always been 
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process 
because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this 
uncharted area are scarce and open-ended. The doctrine of 
judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost 
care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this 
field." Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115, 125 
(1992) (citation omitted). Addressing the substantive due 
process claim, therefore, requires scrupulous attention to 
the guideposts that have previously been established. 
 
A. 
 
We note preliminarily that establishing a substantive due 
process claim even when executive action has infringed an 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause is difficult. 
"Our cases dealing with abusive executive action have 
repeatedly emphasized that only the most egregious official 
conduct can be said to be `arbitrary in the constitutional 
sense. . . .' " County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 
 
                                7 
  
846 (1998) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 
115, 129 (1992)) (emphasis added). For executive conduct, 
the Supreme Court has "for half a century now . .. spoken 
of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that 
which shocks the conscience." See id. Determining whether 
the challenged action rises to this level has been described 
as a "threshold" question in a challenge to an executive 
action. See id. at 847 n.8 ("[T]he threshold question is 
whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so 
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock 
the contemporary conscience. . . . Only if the necessary 
condition of egregious behavior were satisfied would there 
be a possibility of recognizing a substantive due process 
right to be free of such executive action . . . ."). 
 
Though we construe the trial record in Mr. Boyanowski's 
favor, we cannot agree that the conduct of which he 
complains rises to the level required by the Supreme Court 
in Lewis. The statements allegedly made about Donald 
Boyanowski--that he was a "crook" and was responsible for 
cost overruns of the CAIU's transportation program--had 
no direct legal effect upon him. He was not prohibited from 
bidding on contracts or otherwise restricted in his conduct, 
and the comments were not publicized in a manner that 
would humiliate him before the community at large. At 
least one of our sister circuits has found that far more 
defamatory statements did not rise to a conscience- 
shocking level for substantive due process purposes. See 
Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1367-68 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(affirming district court conclusion that banning coach from 
city ice rink and publishing to third parties false statements 
that coach was sexually abusing minor students did not 
rise to conduct that shocked the court's conscience). The 
evidence in this case does not rise to the level of truly 
egregious conduct that is required for a substantive due 
process claim as described by the Supreme Court in Lewis. 
At worst, the evidence indicates sharp business practices 
by a competitor. 
 
It is true that Lewis teaches that what"shocks the 
conscience" varies from circumstance to circumstance. See 
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850 ("Deliberate indifference that shocks 
in one environment may not be so patently egregious in 
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another, and our concern with preserving the constitutional 
proportions of substantive due process demands an exact 
analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is 
condemned as conscience-shocking."). We need not, 
however, definitively calibrate the egregiousness level that 
Lewis would require of a defamation-type claim because 
other precedent makes clear that this sort of claim cannot 
present a substantive due process violation in thefirst 
place. 
 
B. 
 
The Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts 
are not to view defamatory acts as constitutional violations. 
In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), a procedural due 
process case, the Court held that defamation by itself did 
not harm a "liberty" interest protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Paul involved a plaintiff whose 
name and photograph appeared on a police flyer that was 
captioned "Active Shoplifters" and distributed among 
merchants. The Court turned aside a procedural due 
process claim on the grounds that harm to reputation alone 
did not suffice for a constitutional tort based on procedural 
due process. See id. at 711-12. Although the claim was 
based in procedural due process, the Court's holding was 
that the interest in reputation was neither "liberty" nor 
"property" that was protected by the Due Process Clause. 
See id. at 712. 
 
Even more relevant to the case at hand is the Court's 
return to the issue in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). 
In Siegert, the plaintiff was a clinical psychologist who had 
been employed by a federally operated hospital in 
Washington, D.C. He resigned his post, rather than face 
termination, and found another position at a U.S. Army 
hospital in West Germany. That position required 
"credentialing," the securing of which required plaintiff to 
ask his former employer to provide information to the Army 
facility. In response to the request, his former supervisor 
wrote a letter that labeled plaintiff as inept, unethical, and 
untrustworthy. Plaintiff was subsequently denied the 
necessary credentials and ultimately lost his position. He 
then brought a Bivens action against his former supervisor. 
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See id. at 228-29. The Supreme Court rejected the claim. 
Though the Court acknowledged that defamation injuries 
do indeed lead to monetary losses that flow from the injury 
to reputation, it stated that "so long as such damage flows 
from injury caused by the defendant to a plaintiff 's 
reputation, it may be recoverable under state tort law but 
it is not recoverable in a Bivens action." Id. at 234. "The 
statements contained in the letter would undoubtedly 
damage the reputation of one in his position, and impair 
his future employment prospects. But the plaintiff in Paul 
v. Davis similarly alleged serious impairment of his future 
employment opportunities as well as other harm." Id. The 
Court therefore concluded that Siegert failed to allege a 
constitutional deprivation. See id. at 233-34. 
 
Donald Boyanowski also alleged that harm flowed from 
the statements made about him insofar as he was unable 
to receive any of the contracts for which he bid. We do not 
see how his harm was of a different nature from that 
alleged in Siegert. Both plaintiffs alleged harm flowing from 
defamatory statements made by former employers. It is 
therefore hard to see how Siegert is not fatal to the 
substantive due process claim.1 Even if Siegert is construed 
strictly as a procedural due process case, it does not 
support the claim because Siegert declares that the claim of 
harm flowing from the defamatory statement is not a liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Cf. Reich v. 
Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[I]n this circuit 
at least, not all property interests worthy of procedural due 
process protection are protected by the concept of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The similarity of harms in the two cases also would appear to doom 
any effort to link the "stigma plus" analysis that has characterized 
procedural due process cases that have arisen in wake of Paul v. Davis 
and concern defamatory statements, see, e.g., Ersek v. Township of 
Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83 n.5 (3d Cir. 1996), with the substantive due 
process claim urged by Mr. Boyanowski. Even if we were to entertain 
such an application, our precedents are decidedly against such claims. 
See, e.g., Kelly v. Borough of Sayreville, 107 F.3d 1073, 1078 (3d Cir. 
1997) ("[E]ven financial injury due solely to government defamation does 
not constitute a claim for deprivation of a constitutional liberty 
interest."); Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1012-13 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Most, 
if not all, charges of defamation are inevitably accompanied by financial 
loss."). 
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substantive due process."); In re Selcraig , 705 F.2d 789, 
796 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting substantive due process claim 
arising from stigmatization of discharged employee but 
discussing potential availability of procedural name-clearing 
hearing). Indeed, it would be an odd result to hold that the 
CAIU was free to stigmatize Mr. Boyanowski without 
providing him with procedural protections from the 
statements, but was not free to make the statements 
without incurring liability under the Constitution. 
Upholding the substantive due process claim, therefore, 
would not be supported by Supreme Court precedent. 
 
Neither does Mr. Boyanowski's claim find refuge in those 
Third Circuit cases that have upheld substantive due 
process claims. We have recognized substantive due 
process claims in certain limited circumstances when the 
existence of procedural due process protections is not at 
issue. See, e.g., Independent Enters., Inc. v. Pittsburgh 
Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1179 (3d Cir. 1997). 
We have never, however, suggested that a substantive due 
process cause of action lies for the kind of claim pursued 
in the District Court. 
 
Independent Enterprises, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water and 
Sewer Authority is perhaps the most analogous precedent. 
The facts in that case presented a stronger basis for a 
substantive due process claim than do those in the case at 
hand because there was evidence of direct interference by 
executive actors with the procurement of contracts. The 
plaintiff was a contractor who had entered into a consent 
decree with a city water and sewer authority. That decree 
precluded the contractor's being barred based on past 
performance from bidding on city contracts. In subsequent 
bids, the contractor was the low bidder on two contracts 
and received neither. In one case, the contracting authority 
was ordered to halt awarding contracts to the contractor 
because of a cost overrun in a recent project. These actions 
appeared to violate the consent decree, which provided that 
the contractor could not be "disqualified" based on post- 
decree performance absent a hearing under local law. See 
id. at 1168-69. 
 
In ruling whether those facts could be used to state a 
substantive due process claim, we summarized our 
substantive due process jurisprudence as follows: 
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       Although the Third Circuit has recognized that a 
       governmental deprivation that comports with 
       procedural due process may still give rise to a 
       substantive due process claim "upon allegations that 
       the government deliberately and arbitrarily abused its 
       power," we have also held that a substantive due 
       process claim grounded in an arbitrary exercise of 
       governmental authority may be maintained only where 
       the plaintiff has been deprived of a "particular quality 
       of property interest." Although our court has suggested 
       that only fundamental property interests are worthy of 
       substantive due process protection, it has provided 
       little additional guidance regarding what specific 
       property interests should receive substantive due 
       process protection. 
 
Id. at 1179 (citations omitted). 
 
Though it ultimately "le[ft] for another day definition of 
the precise contours of the `particular quality of property 
interest' entitled to substantive due process protection," id. 
at 1180, the Independent Enterprises panel observed that 
the infringed interest must be a concrete one: 
 
       We have held that "ownership is a property interest 
       worthy of substantive due process protection," 
       [DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for the Township 
       of West Amwell, 53 F.3d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 1995)], but 
       we have found that neither interest in prompt receipt 
       of payment for professional services provided to the 
       state, Reich, 883 F.2d at 244-45, nor state law 
       entitlement to water and sewer services, Ransom v. 
       Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 411-12 (3d Cir. 1988), are the 
       "certain quality" of property interest worthy of 
       substantive due process protection. We have also 
       strongly suggested in dictum that a student's right to 
       continued enrollment in a graduate program does not 
       rise to such a level on the ground that such an interest 
       bears " `little resemblance to the fundamental interests 
       that previously have been viewed as implicitly protected 
       by the Constitution.' " Mauriello v. Univ. of Med. & 
       Dentistry of N.J., 781 F.2d 46, 50 (3d Cir. 1986) 
       (quoting Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing , 474 
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       U.S. 214, 229-30, 106 S.Ct. 507, 516, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 
       (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 
Id. at 1180 (quoting Homar v. Gilbert , 89 F.3d 1009, 1021 
(3d Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 924 
(1997)). 
 
Applying this precedent, we ruled that the facts in 
Independent Enterprises did not give rise to a viable 
substantive due process claim, observing that we had"no 
difficulty" in concluding that the alleged interest was not 
the sort of fundamental interest protected by substantive 
due process. See id. We view the facts in Independent 
Enterprises, where defendants actively prevented plaintiffs 
from winning contracts in violation of a consent decree, as 
constituting a more compelling claim that a protected 
interest had been violated than that proffered by Donald 
Boyanowski, who was never barred from having his bids 
considered. There is no basis in our substantive due 
process precedent for according him the relief that he 
seeks. 
 
C. 
 
The District Court's jury instruction characterized the 
issue at stake as Donald Boyanowski's liberty interest to 
engage in the transportation business. In its denial of 
CAIU's post-trial motion, the District Court defended this 
characterization by referring to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923). The District Court described Donald 
Boyanowski's defamation-based damages as "derived from a 
fundamental liberty interest to engage in the common 
occupations of life protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Op. at 10 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923)). 
 
As discussed above, our precedent has never read 
substantive due process as extending as far as did the 
District Court. Contrary to that court, we do not view Meyer 
as helpful to the substantive due process claim before us. 
Meyer involved a prosecution of a teacher who violated a 
statutory bar on the teaching of a foreign language. In 
reversing the conviction on due process grounds, the 
Supreme Court uttered the broad and celebrated language 
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about the right to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, on which the District Court's opinion 
relies. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. The case turned, 
however, on a direct bar to the teacher's teaching, as well 
as the concurrent interference in parental rights over 
children. See id. at 400. The more analogous situation for 
Mr. Boyanowski, if Meyer were relevant, would have 
involved a prosecution targeting him for the mere act of 
bidding on transportation contracts. His actual situation 
was too remote from the facts of Meyer for that case to have 
particular applicability. 
 
The Supreme Court has already held that Meyer  may not 
be read to constitutionalize all executive actions that affect 
the pursuit of a profession in any way. See Conn v. 
Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292 (1999). In Conn, the Court 
rejected an attorney's attempt to claim that a search 
warrant executed upon him while his client was testifying 
before a grand jury violated the attorney's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to practice his profession. In so doing, 
the Court focused on the language of Meyer on which the 
District Court relies here, but specifically rejected its 
application to the plaintiff 's circumstances. See id. at 1295. 
We similarly view Meyer as too slender a reed on which to 
rest Mr. Boyanowski's substantive due process claim. 
 
Moreover, the approach taken by the District Court 
would subsume broad categories of tort law under the 
constitutional aegis. Equating a defamatory statement that 
leads to a third party's not extending a contract to a 
frustrated plaintiff with the deprivation of the plaintiff 's 
legal right to engage in the common occupations of life in 
a manner protected by the Fourteenth Amendment goes too 
far. It is true that such an action has some effect on an 
individual's ability to navigate the often treacherous waters 
of government contracting, but to leap to the broad level of 
generality necessary to classify the harm in substantive due 
process terms would constitutionalize broad swaths of state 
tort law. 
 
If Donald Boyanowski's claim can survive, the same 
could be said for any number of mundane state tort cases 
that lack a clear constitutional basis. In addition to 
implicitly overruling the Supreme Court's holding in Siegert, 
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upholding the verdict would ignore the Supreme Court's 
twin commands that the Fourteenth Amendment not 
become a font of tort law that supplants state systems, see 
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701, and that the cause of action 
encompassed by substantive due process not be expanded 
without extreme care, see Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. 
 
Because Donald Boyanowski's claim, the record evidence, 
and the District Court's jury instruction all point to a state 
law defamation claim and not a constitutional substantive 
due process claim, we will reverse the judgment entered on 
the jury verdict in favor of Mr. Boyanowski on his 
substantive due process claim against the CAIU. Our ruling 
in this regard moots his cross-appeal as to the District 
Court's grant of qualified immunity to Nagle. 
 
III. 
 
We turn to Dorothy Boyanowski's jury verdict for civil 
conspiracy against Frye and Nagle. The defendants offer an 
array of arguments in support of our setting aside the 
verdict. First, they submit that the jury's verdict in their 
favor as to the underlying tort of tortious interference with 
contract requires dismissal of the civil conspiracy verdict. 
Second, they contend that the defense verdict on the tort 
claim vitiates any award of damages on the conspiracy 
claim. Third, the defendants argue that they had no legal 
capacity to conspire; they submit that because under 
Pennsylvania precedent a corporation cannot conspire with 
itself, Dorothy Boyanowski had to prove that Frye or Nagle 
was acting outside the scope of his duty for personal 
reasons. Fourth, the defendants claim that there was no 
evidence of a concerted action or common scheme 
necessary to sustain a conspiracy finding. Fifth, the 
defendants assert that no evidence was presented 
indicating that Frye and Nagle willfully engaged in unlawful 
conduct, and that such evidence is a prerequisite for the 
removal of their statutory immunity under Pennsylvania 
law. Furthermore, the defendants submit that Frye and 
Nagle should have been given absolute immunity as"high 
public officials." Finally, the defendants claim that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict 
against them on the claim of civil conspiracy. 
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Many of these assignments of error pertain to the 
sufficiency of the evidence presented by Ms. Boyanowski at 
trial. Unfortunately, rather than provide any citations to the 
record in their brief on appeal, which consisted mostly of 
assertions that were unsupported by citation, legal or 
otherwise, the Boyanowskis' counsel elected simply to 
submit several volumes of trial transcript, refer to the trial 
record as a whole, and unhelpfully tell this Court that "only 
a review of the entire record can totally illuminate the entire 
picture heard by the jury." Appellees' Br. at 14. At oral 
argument the panel afforded counsel a second opportunity 
to point to specific instances in the record that supported 
the jury's findings in this matter. Although the evidence in 
the record finally cited by the Boyanowskis' lawyer is 
exceedingly thin, possibly to the point of justifying reversal 
on insufficiency grounds alone, we need not consider the 
weight of the evidence presented at trial because the issue 
can ultimately be disposed of on the defendants'first 
assignment of error. 
 
In their brief, the defendants point to Pennsylvania 
precedent that holds that a claim of civil conspiracy cannot 
be pled without also alleging an underlying tort. See, e.g., 
Nix. v. Temple Univ., 596 A.2d 1132, 1137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1991); Pelagatti v. Cohen, 536 A.2d 1337, 1342 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1987). They fail, however, to cite authority for the 
proposition that once an underlying tort has been alleged, 
only a finding that the underlying tort has occurred will 
allow an appellate court to sustain a similar finding on the 
civil conspiracy charge. The rule that civil conspiracy may 
not exist without an underlying tort is a common one. See 
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 
781, 789 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). Indeed, "we 
are unaware of any jurisdiction that recognizes civil 
conspiracy as a cause of action requiring no separate 
tortious conduct." Id. at 789. It is not surprising that there 
are few cases dealing with the sort of mixed verdict we have 
here, as a jury would not logically be expected to determine 
that civil conspiracy occurred, but that the underlying tort 
did not. Candidates for such verdicts would usually be 
screened out at the summary judgment or pleading stage, 
and that is indeed where most precedents that state the 
underlying tort rule are to be found. We must therefore 
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predict whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
apply a rule that is normally employed at the pleading stage 
to overturn a jury verdict for civil conspiracy in a plaintiff 's 
favor. We predict that it would. 
 
In predicting how a matter would be decided under state 
law we examine: (1) what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has said in related areas; (2) the decisional law of the 
Pennsylvania intermediate courts; (3) federal appeals and 
district court cases interpreting the state law; and (4) 
decisions from other jurisdictions that have discussed the 
issues we face here. See Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 995 F.2d 457, 459-60 (3d Cir. 1993). While we lack a 
clear statement from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on 
the precise question at issue, a panel of the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court recently decided a case that would 
decisively resolve the issue if we follow the resulting 
precedent. See GMH Assoc., Inc. v. Prudential Realty Group, 
CB, ___ A.2d ___, No. 198 EDA 1999, 2000 WL 228918 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. March 1, 2000). 
 
GMH arose out of a failed real estate transaction. The 
trial court, sitting without a jury, found defendants liable to 
plaintiffs for breach of contract, breach of duty to negotiate 
in good faith, promissory estoppel, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, fraudulent non-disclosure, and civil 
conspiracy. See id. at *5. On appeal, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court concluded that no fraud had actually 
occurred. See id. at *10. The claim of fraud was the 
underpinning for the civil conspiracy claim. See id. at *13. 
Because the fraud claim was set aside, the court held that 
the civil conspiracy claim could not survive: 
 
        [Plaintiffs'] conspiracy claims were based on the 
       allegation that all defendants conspired to defraud 
       [plaintiff]. Because we conclude that no fraud was 
       committed, we correspondingly find that no civil 
       conspiracy to defraud occurred. See generally  
       [Rutherford v. Presbyterian-Univ. Hosp., 612 A.2d 500, 
       508 (Pa. Super. 1992)] (citing Rose v. Wissinger, 294 
       Pa. Super. 265, 439 A.2d 1193 (1982) (where 
       complaint fails to set forth claim for defamation or 
       outrageous conduct causing emotional distress, there 
       could be no conspiracy to commit those acts); and 
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       Raneri v. DePolo, 65 Pa.Cmwlth. 183, 441 A.2d 1373, 
       1376 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1982) (under Pennsylvania law, 
       when a party fails "to sufficiently allege in[other] 
       counts any unlawful act or unlawful means" the 
       conspiracy claim must also fail when it is based on 
       these claims)). 
 
Id. 
 
As the quoted passage makes clear, the court did not 
dismiss the conspiracy claims based on an independent 
evaluation of their viability in light of the record developed 
by the trial court. Rather, the failure of the underlying 
fraud claim sufficed as a matter of law to vitiate the finding 
of civil conspiracy notwithstanding the fact that it had been 
successfully pled as an independent cause of action. 
 
An intermediate appellate state court's decision"is a 
datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be 
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by 
other persuasive data that the highest court of the state 
would decide otherwise." West v. American Telephone & Tel. 
Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). We not only conclude that 
GMH is persuasive on its logic, but rather thanfinding 
sufficient contrary persuasive data, we find other factors 
that counsel that we follow the GMH court. 
 
The precept employed by GMH is logically sound. It is 
sensible that the rule requiring the existence of an 
underlying tort in the pleading stage similarly requires that 
the tort be proven if a civil conspiracy claim is to prevail. To 
be sure, there are arguments to the contrary. One could 
argue the reverse inference and maintain that the jury's 
finding that there was a civil conspiracy against Dorothy 
Boyanowski that caused damage means that the jury's 
ruling for the defendants in the tortious interference of 
contract claim was actually the legally incorrect one. 
Another argument is that the two causes of action, 
whatever their linkage in the pleading stage, are distinct. 
Inconsistent jury verdicts are an unfortunate fact of life in 
law, and should not, in and of themselves, be used to 
overturn otherwise valid verdicts. Cf. Mosley v. Wilson, 102 
F.3d 85, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1996) (ruling that district court 
erred as a matter of law when it directed judgment 
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notwithstanding the jury's verdict on one claim on the sole 
ground that it was inconsistent with the jury's verdict on 
another claim). 
 
We nonetheless believe that the defendants' reading is 
the better one in light of the nature of civil conspiracy. 
"Since liability for civil conspiracy depends on performance 
of some underlying tortious act, the conspiracy is not 
independently actionable; rather, it is a means for 
establishing vicarious liability for the underlying tort." 
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1983). A 
verdict on civil conspiracy should yield to a finding for the 
defendant on the underlying tort because the cause of 
action is wholly subordinate to the underlying tort's 
existence. We also are supported by the fact that courts in 
other jurisdictions have made similar holdings to that in 
GMH when faced with similar circumstances. See K&S 
Partnership v. Continental Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 980 
(8th Cir. 1991); see also Akins v. Zeneca, Inc. , 62 F.3d 
1417, 1995 WL 452087, (6th Cir. July 27, 1995) (affirming 
district court's dismissal of civil conspiracy claim after close 
of plaintiff 's evidence because of failure to prove underlying 
tort). 
 
In light of the clear statement by the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court, practice in other jurisdictions, and what we 
perceive as the logical rule, we predict that if faced with 
this matter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reverse 
Dorothy Boyanowski's judgment for civil conspiracy. We 
therefore need not reach the defendants' other arguments 
for reversing the verdict. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be reversed, with 
direction to enter judgment in favor of the defendants on all 
counts. 
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